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“All the cruel and brutal things, even genocide, 
start with the humiliation of one individual.”
Kofi Annan
Social scientists increasingly refer to the role of humili-
ation in their theorizing of intergroup relations ( Elison 
&  Harter, 2007; Hartling et al., 2013; Hartling & 
Luchetta, 1999; Lindner, 2002, 2006; Saurette, 2005) and 
their analyses of real intergroup conflicts such as the gen-
ocide in Rwanda (Gasanabo, 2006; Lindner, 2001a), the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Gaza (Ginges & Atran, 2008), 
the Holocaust of the second world war (Lindner, 2001a), 
or the unrests in Northern Ireland (Stokes, 2006). 
Indeed, pe ople feel humiliated not only because of the 
h umiliation experienced personally but also because 
of the humiliation brought upon important ingroups 
(Jonas et al., 2014) or another person that one shares a 
group membership with (Veldhuis et al., 2014). Reading 
or h earing about or witnessing a devaluing event that 
targets persons with whom one shares a group mem-
bership might actually be the most common situation 
in which humiliation is experienced. However, studies 
on vicarious humiliation and its consequences for inter-
group relations are rather scarce (with the exception 
of Veldhuis et al., 2014). To our knowledge, vicarious 
humiliation resulting from witnessing an ingroup mem-
ber being negatively stereotyped has never been studied 
together with both its emotional and motivational impli-
cations.1 The present paper reports three scenario-based 
experiments conducted in different real-life intergroup 
contexts that tested both the emotional and motivational 
implications of vicarious humiliation and its conditional-
ity upon the intergroup context.
Humiliation refers to both an event and a feeling 
(Lindner, 2001b). Potentially humiliating events are situ-
ations characterized by social exclusion and rejection 
(Elison & Harter, 2007; Gilbert, 1997; Jonas et al., 2014; 
Veldhuis et al., 2014), status loss (Hartling & Luchetta, 1999; 
Torres & Bergner, 2010), disrespect and degradation 
(Hartling & Luchetta, 1999; Saurette, 2005), and/or being 
placed in a powerless position (Lindner, 2002, 2006). 
Humiliation as a feeling is intensely negative, it is expe-
rienced as painful and undeserved (Klein, 1991), and it 
seems to be long-lasting (Mann et al., 2017). It is likely to 
be felt when individuals experience a negative discrep-
ancy between how they are seen by others compared 
to how they see themselves (Miller, 1993). More specifi-
cally, humiliation is elicited when individuals perceive 
others’ actions towards them as devaluing their selves 
and as lessening their significance that they believe 
to have (Coleman et al., 2007; Kruglanski et al., 2014; 
McCarley, 2009; Webber et al., 2018). Humiliation, whether 
as an event or as a feeling, is an unfortunate reality for 
many individuals and groups.
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Just Hearing About It Makes Me Feel So Humiliated: 
Emotional and Motivational Responses to Vicarious 
Group-Based Humiliation
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Witnessing a fellow ingroup member being humiliated might be the most common situation in which inter-
group humiliation is experienced. Humiliation on a group level is as complex as humiliation on an interper-
sonal level because of shared appraisals with other emotions. We propose that witnessing a fellow ingroup 
member being negatively stereotyped by an outgroup member elicits anger and/or shame insofar as it is 
appraised as vicariously humiliating leading to anger-related approach and shame-related avoidance. Evi-
dence for this proposition was experimentally assessed in three studies using two intergroup contexts: 
nationality (Study 1: n = 291) and gender (Study 2: n = 429 females and Study 3: n = 353 males). Across 
these intergroup contexts, the group-devaluing event emphasizing a negative ingroup stereotype evoked 
anger-related approach and shame-related avoidance indirectly through vicarious humiliation. We conclude 
that the accompanying emotions and thus resulting motivations determine whether vicarious humiliation 
results in intergroup conflict.
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Humiliation is most likely to be evoked as part 
of emotional blends (Fernández et al., 2015; 
Leidner et al., 2012). According to appraisal theories of 
emotions (Frijda et al., 1989; Roseman, 1991; Scherer, 1984; 
Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), emotional blends result from 
the fact that different emotions share core appraisals. For 
example, Fernández et al. (2015) showed for interper-
sonal humiliation that accepting a devaluation does not 
only evoke the feeling of humiliation but also of shame 
and embarrassment; whereas, appraising a devaluation as 
unjust elicits the emotional blend of humiliation and anger.
Previous research does not only acknowledge that humil-
iation occurs in conjunction with the feelings of anger 
and shame (e.g., Fernández et al., 2015; Goldman, 2008; 
Jonas et al., 2014) but also proposes that humiliation 
simultaneously leads to both approach tendencies typi-
cally associated with anger and avoidance tendencies 
typically associated with shame (Fernández et al., 2015; 
Jonas et al., 2014; Leidner et al., 2012). Approach and 
avoidance tendencies correspond with the appetitive 
and aversive motivational systems that represent the 
core elements in the organization of behavior (Carver & 
Harmon-Jones, 2009: 184). Approach tendencies indicate 
‘the impulse to go toward’ (Harmon-Jones et al., 2013: 
291). In contrast, avoidance tendencies refer to inactions 
such as withdrawal or inertia (Ginges & Atran, 2008). 
Because humiliation is an interaction-orientated emotion 
(Coleman et al., 2007), its motivational implications of 
approach and avoidance are other-directed, yet with differ-
ent outcomes for the relationship between the humiliated 
and the humiliator. While approach aims at correcting or 
changing the relationship with the humiliator, avoidance 
aims at escaping from the interaction with the humiliator 
and, thus, temporarily from this relationship.
To sum up, humiliation is a complex experience because of 
its tendency to be elicited in emotional blends with other emo-
tions due to shared core appraisals and because it can evoke 
conflicting (Leidner et al., 2012) and paradoxical (Fernández 
et al., 2015) behavioral intentions that include the tenden-
cies to retaliate and to withdraw (Elison & Harter, 2007; 
Ginges & Atran, 2008; Leidner et al., 2012; Thomaes et al., 
2011; Torres & Bergner, 2010). It is an interaction-orientated 
emotion (Coleman et al., 2007a) that can occur on interper-
sonal (Fisk, 2001; Hartling & Luchetta, 1999), intragroup, 
and intergroup levels (Veldhuis et al., 2014). Humiliation 
on an intergroup level might result from being humiliated 
by an outgroup because of one’s group membership (i.e., 
group-membership-based humiliation, see Veldhuis et al., 
2014: 2) or from witnessing a fellow ingroup member being 
humiliated by an outgroup (i.e., vicarious group-based 
humiliation).
Humiliation on intergroup level
Most research studied humiliation in interpersonal rela-
tions and as sharing appraisals with other emotions  (Elison 
& Harter, 2007; Farmer & McGuffin, 2003; Fernández et 
al., 2015; Hartling & Luchetta, 1999; Klein, 1991; McCarley, 
2009; Negrao et al., 2005; Pulham, 2009). Appraisal theo-
ries of emotion have also been used in theorizing group-
based emotions. According to the intergroup  emotion 
theory, group-based emotions are elicited by events that 
affect groups with which individuals identify, even if 
these events do not affect the individual directly; they are 
largely independent of individual-level emotions because 
events are appraised in terms of their consequences for 
the ingroup rather than for the individual; and they are 
functional in regulating group-relevant behavior (Smith 
& Mackie, 2015: 350). Moreover, group-based emotions 
can occur as emotional blends as well (Ellsworth & Smith, 
1988; Frijda et al., 1989). For instance, previous research 
demonstrated the simultaneous occurrences of humili-
ation and anger and humiliation and shame, which the 
authors attributed to the shared appraisals of other-
related outrage and injustice, and the shared appraisals 
of powerlessness, respectively (Leidner et al., 2012; van 
Driel, 2011). However, the results on the different roles 
of anger and shame accompanying humiliation as group-
based emotion, as well as on the contradicting motiva-
tional implications (i.e., approach and avoidance) for 
intergroup relations, are rather ambiguous. For instance, 
some studies showed that people reported a higher level 
of anger when humiliated on a group level compared to 
being humiliated on a personal level leading to stronger 
intentions to approach (Goldman, 2008). On the other 
hand, Ginges and Atran (2008) found in the context of 
intergroup conflict that humiliation can lead to a sense 
of powerlessness and thus to inertia (i.e., the tendency 
towards inaction that suppresses aggressive responses, see 
Veldhuis et al., 2014).
One limitation of the existing research on intergroup 
humiliation is its focus on humiliating events that elicit 
personally experienced group membership-based humili-
ation, as in most studies participants were asked either 
to recall a personal situation or to put themselves in the 
situation of another ingroup member where they or the 
other person were humiliated because of their group 
membership (Goldman, 2008; Leidner et al., 2012; van 
Driel, 2011). The personal involvement renders these situ-
ations highly relevant for the participant and corresponds 
most probably to many real-life situations. However, the 
disadvantage of this approach is that intergroup humili-
ation cannot be empirically distinguished from personal 
humiliation.
Intergroup humiliation can, however, also be experi-
enced vicariously by witnessing an ingroup member being 
humiliated by an outgroup member. We know only of the 
research by Veldhuis et al. (2014) that examined vicarious 
humiliation resulting from observing an ingroup mem-
ber (with whom the participant shared political orienta-
tion) being repeatedly rejected (i.e., ostracized). Veldhuis 
and colleagues (2014, Studies 2 and 3) found firstly, that 
participants’ feeling of humiliation was similar irrespec-
tive of whether they observed an ingroup member being 
ostracized by outgroup members or whether they were 
personally ostracized, and secondly, that the feeling of 
humiliation was accompanied by powerlessness and 
anger.
Given the pioneering character of Veldhuis and col-
leagues’ (2014) studies, it is not only important to concep-
tually replicate them but also to examine whether their 
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findings are generalizable to other vicariously humiliating 
situations and different intergroup contexts. For instance, 
the manipulation of ostracism might have particularly 
elicited feelings of powerlessness and anger, which might 
not be the case for other humiliating situations and/or 
other intergroup contexts. Our reasoning is based on the 
propositions that vicariously humiliating situations are 
not limited to witnessing another ingroup member being 
rejected but also include losing status and/or being disre-
spected and degraded and/or being placed in a powerless 
position, and that those different humiliating situations 
are differently appraised (see Fernández et al., 2015). For 
example, compared to being vicariously rejected, being 
vicariously negatively stereotyped might be appraised as 
being unjust or as a legitimate critique. Hence, the experi-
ence of vicarious group-based humiliation can be accom-
panied by not only feelings of powerlessness and anger (as 
is the case in the research of Veldhuis et al., 2014) but also 
by the feeling of shame (see Leidner et al., 2012). These 
different emotional blends of humiliation account for the 
paradoxical intentions to approach and/or to avoid (e.g., 
Ginges & Atran, 2008; Goldman, 2008; van Driel, 2011).
Besides, how individuals appraise and thus respond 
emotionally and motivationally to a vicariously humiliat-
ing situation might also be conditional upon the inter-
group context. As previous research on group-based 
emotions has shown, the same intergroup situation 
provokes different emotions in different social groups 
(Ray et al., 2008; Yzerbyt et al., 2003), which implies that 
emotional reactions to a similar humiliating event depend 
on the salient social categorization. Thus, we hypoth-
esized that witnessing a fellow ingroup member being 
negatively stereotyped elicits anger-related approach and 
shame-related avoidance insofar as vicarious humiliation 
is experienced, and we explored its conditionality upon 
group context. Therefore, the present research extends 
the work by Veldhuis and colleagues (2014) by not only 
exploring the emotional and motivational implications of 
being vicariously negatively stereotyped but also by con-
sidering the role of intergroup context.
Moreover, the present research contributes to research 
on vicarious emotions, which has so far mainly focussed 
on empathy and sympathy (Miller et al., 1996), guilt 
(Lickel et al., 2005), and shame (Welten et al., 2012). 
Explanations on why people can vicariously experience 
group-based emotions have been informed by research 
on empathy and social identity. For instance, vicarious 
group-based shame has been shown to be determined 
by both empathy and social identity processes (Welten et 
al., 2012). Likewise, Lickel and colleagues (2005) demon-
strated that participants felt vicarious shame because of 
the social identity they share with a wrongdoer; whereas, 
emotional closeness with the wrongdoer predicted vicari-
ous guilt. Different from vicarious shame and vicarious 
guilt, which follow from witnessing an ingroup member 
doing something wrong, vicarious humiliation follows 
from observing an ingroup member being wronged by 
an outgroup member. Although not explicitly controlled 
for in the present research, we assume, based on inter-
group emotion theory (Smith et al., 2007), that vicarious 
group-based humiliation presumes at least shared social 
identity between the person humiliated and the person 
witnessing the humiliation.
To conclude, although it is plausible to assume that 
intergroup humiliation is experienced—and used in politi-
cal discourse—most of the time vicariously, an analysis of 
the state of the art reveals that there is not enough research 
addressing intergroup humiliation as vicarious group-
based humiliation. More precisely, we do not know of any 
research where negative ingroup stereotyping was stud-
ied as a trigger of vicarious group-based humiliation and 
where the blends of anger and shame, as well as the moti-
vation tendencies to approach and to avoid, were assessed 
simultaneously in different intergroup contexts. Filling 
this gap is relevant because whether vicariously humili-
ated group members opt for action tendencies aiming at 
changing or avoiding the relationship with the humiliator 
has implications for future intergroup relations.
Present research
To study intergroup humiliation as vicarious group-based 
humiliation, we experimentally manipulated exposure 
to witnessing a fellow ingroup member being devalued 
using an experimental vignette design, which has been 
demonstrated to be effective when testing for causal 
relationships (Atzmüller & Steiner, 2010) and in particu-
lar when testing for the effects of mediators (e.g., Flores 
et al., 2018). Vicarious humiliation, feelings of anger and 
shame, and approach and avoidance tendencies were 
measured. We predicted that witnessing a fellow ingroup 
member being negatively stereotyped elicits anger-related 
approach and shame-related avoidance insofar as vicari-
ous humiliation is experienced. The conditionality of 
these indirect effects was studied by conducting three 
experiments in two intergroup contexts, nationality and 
gender, using the following ingroup memberships (data 
available under osf.io/tmzps): South African nationals 
(n = 291), females (n = 429), and males (n = 353).
Method
Participants
Participants in all scenario-based experiments were 
undergraduate, mainly part-time students registered with 
the University of South Africa. We used the freely available 
online calculator by Soper (2018) to determine the mini-
mum required sample size for a structural equation model 
with 5 latent and 16 observed variables (see Figure 1). 
Assuming an alpha level of 0.05 and a priori statistical 
power of 0.8, the minimum sample size to test the model 
structure would have been 173, while the minimum sam-
ple size to detect an effect of medium size (s) of 0.3 (cal-
culated as Gini-correlation; Westland, 2010) would have 
been 150. As we were not certain of the actual effect size 
in the population, we targeted a sample size of about 
300 participants given that an n of 376 would have been 
necessary to detect a somewhat smaller effect of size 0.2. 
Two hundred and ninety-one participants participated in 
Experiment 1 using nationality as ingroup membership. 
The age of participants ranged from 18 to 56 years with a 
mean age of 30.6. One hundred and ten participants indi-
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cated that they are male, and 150 participants indicated 
that they are female. Thirty-one participants did not indi-
cate their gender.
Based on the results of the actual effect sizes found in 
Experiment 1, which ranged from 0.2 to 0.5, we targeted 
the minimum required sample size of 376 participants for 
Experiment 2 (using females as ingroup membership) and 
Experiment 3 (using males as ingroup membership) to 
meet the assumptions of an effect size (s) of 0.2, an alpha 
level of 0.05, and a statistical power of 0.8. In Experiment 
2, a total of 429 female students participated with a mean 
age of 32.8 ranging from 18 to 68 years; whereas, 353 
male students participated in Experiment 3 with a mean 
age of 34.6 ranging from 20 to 66 years.
Procedure and measurements
Ethical clearance was obtained from the University of 
South Africa. All three experiments were conducted using 
the online platform Qualtrics (https://www.qualtrics.
com). Participants were invited via email to participate and 
provided with a link to the experiments. On the first page, 
participants were informed that our research is studying 
the perceptions regarding social groups in our society, in 
particular nationality and gender. After providing consent 
for their participation, participants were first asked to self-
categorize in terms of nationality (Experiment 1) or gender 
(Experiment 2 and Experiment 3). Using the procedure of 
Reynolds et al. (2001), we further increased the salience 
of the selected social category by asking participants to 
give three short examples for why they are proud to be a 
South African (Experiment 1), a woman (Experiment 2), or 
a man (Experiment 3). Participants were then randomly 
allocated to either the devaluing or control conditions. In 
the devaluing condition, participants were asked to read 
a comment apparently posted on Facebook referring to 
negative ingroup stereotypes that were expressed to a fel-
low ingroup member by outgroup members ( Experiment 
1: incompetence and corruption of South Africans; 
 Experiment 2: females’ inability to drive; Experiment 3: 
male sexual violence towards women). The selection of 
the negative ingroup stereotypes was mainly guided by 
the criteria that the negative stereotypes are plausible, 
 familiar, and relevant for the respective target group, irre-
spective of their alleged truthfulness or blatancy. In the 
control condition, participants were asked to read a com-
ment where an ingroup member was not devalued (see 
Appendix 1. Manipulation of devaluing events, available 
under osf.io/tmzps).
After participants read the Facebook comment, their 
vicarious humiliation and their feelings of anger and 
shame were assessed followed by the assessments of 
approach and avoidance tendencies, manipulation check, 
and demographic information. After participants submit-
ted their responses, they were debriefed. The order of the 
measures was the same in all three experiments. However, 
the items of the measures were randomly presented to the 
participants.
Vicarious humiliation was assessed with five items that 
did not only include known cognitive appraisals (Elison 
& Harter, 2007; Torres & Bergner, 2010; Trumbull, 2008; 
Veldhuis et al., 2014) but also stressed the respective 
group membership: ‘As an [ingroup member], I feel disre-
spected’; ‘As an [ingroup member], I feel that my dignity 
is violated’; ‘As an [ingroup member], I feel humiliated’; 
Figure 1: Structural and measurement model, Experiments 1–3.
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‘As an [ingroup member], I feel not recognized as equal’; 
‘As an [ingroup member], I feel devalued’ (Experiment 1: 
α = 0.93; Experiment 2: α  = 0.91; Experiment 3: α = 0.95). 
The answer format ranged from 1 (Clearly does not describe 
my feelings) to 5 (Clearly describes my feelings).
Participants’ feelings of anger and shame were meas-
ured on a scale ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Extremely). 
They were provided with the same list of feelings as used 
by Veldhuis et al. (2014), and they were asked ‘to indi-
cate to what extent the following emotions match your 
feelings right now’. Three items measured anger: angry, 
annoyed, outraged (Experiment 1: α = 0.86; Experiment 
2: α = 0.85; Experiment 3: α = 0.90); and three items 
measured shame: ashamed, small, shame (Experiment 1: 
α = 0.83; Experiment 2: α = 0.83; Experiment 3: α = 0.82). 
Three positive emotions (joy, happy, proud) were added as 
filler items that were not considered in further analysis.
Participants’ approach tendencies were assessed by 
two items: ‘To file a complaint’ and ‘To sign a petition’ 
(Experiment 1: r = 0.48, p < 0.01; Experiment 2: r = 0.49, 
p < 0.01: Experiment 3: r = 0.49, p < 0.01). Avoidance ten-
dencies were assessed by two items: ‘To avoid interactions’ 
and ‘To hide from interactions’ (Experiment 1: r = 0.70, 
p < 0.01; Experiment 2: r = 0.66, p < 0.01; Experiment 3: 
r = 0.73, p < 0.01). For both measures, participants were 
asked to indicate the likelihood that they would engage 
in those behaviors at that moment using an answer for-
mat ranging from 1 (Extremely unlikely) to 5 (Extremely 
likely).
The manipulation check of the devaluing event was 
assessed through three items: ‘In the Facebook entry, 
the South African supporting staff member/the woman/
the man was treated unfairly/humiliated/disrespected’ 
(αExperiment 1 = 0.97, αExperiment 2 = 0.94, αExperiment 3 = 0.96). All 
items were assessed using an answer format ranging from 
1 (Not at all) to 5 (Extremely).
Results
Preliminary analysis
Results of the manipulation check showed that par-
ticipants in the devaluing condition of Experiment 1 
(M = 4.15, SD = 0.96), Experiment 2 (M = 4.27, SD = 0.77), 
and Experiment 3 (M = 3.37, SD = 1.24) scored significantly 
higher on the manipulation check measure than partici-
pants in the respective control conditions, Experiment 1 
(M = 1.49, SD = 0.91), t(276) = –23.76, p < 0.001, d = 2.84; 
 Experiment 2 (M = 1.77, SD = 1.08), t(359.50) = –27.12, 
p < 0.001, d = 2.66 and Experiment 3 (M = 1.55, SD = 0.94), 
t(324.46) = –15.19, p < 0.001, d = 1.65. These results sug-
gest that the manipulation was successful in all three 
experiments.
Table 1 reports the means, standard deviations, and the 
inter-correlations of the principal variables for the three 
experiments. The directions of the correlations between 
vicarious humiliation, anger, and shame replicated previ-
ous findings in that anger and shame did not only cor-
relate strongly with each other but also with humiliation 
(Elison & Harter, 2007). Correlations of humiliation with 
the motivational tendencies were also significant except 
for Experiment 2 (females as ingroup-membership) in 
which it did not correlate significantly with avoidance 
tendencies.
Main analyses
To examine our prediction that witnessing a fellow ingroup 
member being devalued elicits anger-related approach 
and shame-related avoidance insofar as the event is 
appraised as vicariously humiliating, we estimated the 
Table 1: Means, standard deviations, and inter-correlations of principal variables, Experiments 1–3.
1 2 3 4 5
Experiment 1 Mean 2.74 2.37 2.00 2.54 3.00
SD 1.25 1.14 1.03 1.09 1.03
n 291 291 291 291 291
Experiment 2 Mean 3.00 2.30 1.74 2.35 3.21
SD 1.44 1.25 1.00 1.10 1.14
n 429 429 429 429 429
Experiment 3 Mean 2.09 1.96 1.73 2.45 2.72
SD 1.13 1.07 1.00 1.06 1.11
n 353 353 353 353 353
1 Vicarious humiliation – 0.568*** 0.509*** 0.254*** 0.201**
2 Anger 0.648***/0.576*** – 0.662*** 0.224*** 0.286***
3 Shame 0.468***/0.515*** 0.653***/0.664*** – 0.314*** 0.225***
4 Avoidance 0.089/0.127* 0.110*/0.088 0.230***/0.149** – –0.059
5 Approach 0.324**/0.121* 0.427**/0.219*** 0.221***/0.198*** 0.016/0.089 –
Note: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 (two-tailed); correlation coefficients of Experiment 1 are reported in the upper right part of 
the table and of Experiment 2 (first coefficient) and Experiment 3 (second coefficient) in the lower left part of the table.
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indirect effects from the devaluing event on approach and 
avoidance through vicarious humiliation and anger and 
through vicarious humiliation and shame, respectively. 
These indirect effects were estimated through structural 
equation analyses using Amos 25. To test whether these 
predicted effects are conditional upon the intergroup 
context, we compared the data of the three experiments 
using multi-group comparison (Byrne, 2004).
The model included direct paths from the devalu-
ing event (coded as 1 and control condition coded as 0) 
and from vicarious humiliation to approach and avoid-
ance, and all indirect paths from the devaluing event to 
approach and avoidance via vicarious humiliation and the 
accompanying feelings of anger and shame (see Figure 1). 
Moreover, measurement residuals and structural residuals 
were assumed to be independent of each other except for 
the residuals of the latent variables of anger and shame 
as well as of approach and avoidance, respectively. One 
measurement weight of each latent construct was set one 
to define the scale of the construct. For all parameter esti-
mates, we applied bootstrapping with 2000 iterations, cal-
culating 95% adjusted percentile confidence intervals and 
indirect effects using user-defined estimands.
Intergroup context dependency: Explorative analyses
In the first step of our analysis, we examined the context-
dependency of the relationships between the theoretical 
constructs by comparing the data of the three experiments 
using multi-group comparison. We first compared the 
totally unconstrained model that allowed between-group 
differences in all estimated parameters (Model 1) with the 
structural weights unconstrained model (Model 2) that, 
apart from context-specific item intercepts, only allowed 
between-group differences in structural weights while 
measurement weights, measurement residuals, and cor-
relations between structural residuals were constrained to 
be equal between all groups. The results as depicted in 
Table 2 show that although the chi-square increased sig-
nificantly from Model 1 (totally unconstrained) to Model 2 
(structural weights unconstrained), the estimated parame-
ters decreased from 123 to 67, the RMSEA did not change, 
and the parsimony adjusted fit indices for the NFI and the 
CFI improved from Model 1 to Model 2, which indicates a 
substantial gain in parsimony compensating for the slight 
decrease in model fit. These results suggest configural and 
metric measurement equivalence in terms of item load-
ings and variances of item residuals. Thus, for all further 
analyses, we decided to assume equal parameters among 
the intergroup contexts, except for the structural weights.
Secondly, we tested whether there were any differences 
between the contexts regarding the relations between the 
theoretical constructs. For that, we compared the struc-
tural weights unconstrained model (Model 2) with the 
totally constrained model (Model 5) that did not allow for 
between-group differences in any of the model param-
eters. The model fit of Model 5 (totally constrained) was 
significantly worse compared to Model 2, indicating signif-
icant between-group differences in the structural weights.
Table 2: Model Comparisons, Experiments 1–3.




 Structural weights 
unconstrained






Model 5 Totally 
 constrained 
model
Number of parameter  estimates 123 67 54 44 41
Chi-Square (285) = 655.7*** (341) = 787.9*** (354) = 795.1*** (364) = 821.4*** (367) = 932.4***
Chi-Square/DF 2.30 2.31 2.25 2.26 2.54
NFI 0.939 0.926 0.926 0.923 0.913
(parsimony adjusted) (0.743) (0.877) (0.910) (0.933) (0.930)
CFI 0.964 0.957 0.957 0.956 0.945
(parsimony adjusted) (0.763) (0.906) (0.941) (0.966) (0.964)
RMSEA 0.035 0.035 0.034 0.034 0.038
Model Comparison ΔChi-Square
Model 2 (56) = 132.3***
Model 3 (69) = 139.5*** (13) = 7.2
Model 4 (79) = 165.7*** (23) = 33.5 (10) = 26.3**
Model 5 (82) = 276.7*** (26) = 144.5*** (13) = 137.2*** (3) = 111.0***
Note: All models allowed item intercepts to differ across groups. Apart from that, Model 1 allowed between-group differences in structural 
covariances, measurement weights, structural weights, correlations between structural residuals, and variance of measurement residuals 
(totally unconstrained model). Model 2 only allowed between-group differences in structural weights while all other parameters were 
constrained to be equal between all studies. Model 3 only allowed for differences between the female group (Experiment 2) and the 
other two groups in structural weights. Model 4 only allowed for differences between the female group (Experiment 2) and the other 
two groups on the structural weights of the effects of the devaluing event on vicarious humiliation, approach, and avoidance. Model 5 
did not allow for between-group differences in any of the model parameters. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.001.
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Next, we elaborated in more detail how the relations 
between the constructs differed between intergroup con-
texts. As can be seen in Figure 2, which reports the results 
of Model 2, the standardized regression coefficients of 
Experiment 1 (nationality) and Experiment 3 (males) 
were fairly similar, but some were different from those 
of Experiment 2 (females). Consequently, we compared 
the structural weights unconstrained model (Model 2) 
with a limited structural weights unconstrained model 
(Model 3), which constrained the structural weights 
of Experiments 1 and 3 to be equal. As can be seen in 
Table 2, the model fit did not drop significantly from 
Model 2 to Model 3. The latter is the more parsimonious 
and best-fitting model according to the chi-square-to-
degrees-of-freedom-ratio and the RMSEA. It is, therefore, 
fair to assume that there were no statistically significant 
differences in the structural weights between the nation-
ality and male context. More specifically, the statistically 
significant path from anger to approach, found in the 
nationality context (Experiment 1), was not significantly 
different from the non-significant path found in the male 
context (Experiment 3; see Figure 2).
Lastly, for strictly theoretical reasons we tested a 
fourth model, which is based on the assumption that 
once a devaluation targeting a fellow ingroup member 
is appraised as vicariously humiliating the subsequent 
processes should be the same in all contexts (Model 4: 
Customized). Therefore, all the hypothesized paths from 
vicarious humiliation to approach and avoidance via 
anger and shame were constrained to be equal between 
all three experiments. Given that different devaluations 
can be appraised differently and render different behav-
ioral responses as being appropriate, the paths from the 
devaluing event to vicarious humiliation and to approach 
and avoidance were allowed to be different, but only for 
the female context (Experiment 2), because the previous 
analysis already established that there were no differences 
between the nationality (Experiment 1) and the male con-
texts (Experiment 3). For the sake of parsimony, the paths 
from the devaluing event to anger and shame were also 
constrained to be equal between all three experiments. 
Although the chi-square difference test between Model 
3 and Model 4 showed that introducing these additional 
constraints led to a statistically significant increase of the 
chi-square value, the parsimony adjusted CFI and NFI 
improved, while differences on the remaining fit indexes 
were negligible (Table 2). Taking a more conservative 
approach, we report the results for Model 3 (see Appendix 
2. Table 1, available under osf.io/tmzps) in addition to 
Model 4 (see Table 3).
Tests of predicted indirect effects: Confirmatory analysis
In both Model 3 and Model 4, and irrespective of the inter-
group context (i.e., experiments), the predicted indirect 
effects of the devaluing event through vicarious humilia-
tion and anger on approach, as well as through vicarious 
humiliation and shame on avoidance, were statistically sig-
nificant (Table 3 and Appendix 2. Table 1, available under 
osf.io/tmzps). The significance of each of the components 
of these indirect effects was robust when accounting for 
multiplicity of testing in the structural model. Overall, 13 
regression weights of simple effects on the endogenous 
latent variables were tested simultaneously in the model. 
When applying, for the sake of simplicity, the most con-
servative of several available adjustment methods (i.e., 
Bonferroni, which unrealistically assumes complete inde-
pendence of the different parameters and therefore over-
adjusts for multiplicity; Cribbie, 2000; Smith & Cribbie, 
2013), a threshold of a family-wise error rate (FEW—the 
probability that any of these 13 parameters is significant 
by chance in the sample, although all are 0 in the pop-
ulation) of FEW = 0.05 would imply an average thresh-
old for the error rate per parameter (ERPP—the prob-
ability that a specific  parameter is significant by chance) 
Figure 2: Standardized direct effects estimated in Model 2, Experiment 1/2/3.
Note: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.
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Table 3: Indirect effects of devaluation manipulation on feelings (i.e., vicarious humiliation, anger, and shame) and 
motivational tendencies (i.e., approach and avoidance) estimated in Model 4, Experiments 1–3.
Experiment 1: Nationality and Experiment 3: Males Estimate SE LB UB p
Effects on anger
Devaluation * vicarious humiliation 0.27 0.05 0.17 0.38 <0.001
Effects on shame
Devaluation * vicarious humiliation 0.19 0.04 0.12 0.27 <0.001
Effects on approach
Devaluation * vicarious humiliation –0.00 0.02 –0.05 0.04 0.84
Devaluation * anger 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.14 <0.001
Devaluation * shame 0.00 0.00 –0.01 0.01 0.89
Vicarious humiliation * anger 0.22 0.04 0.15 0.30 <0.001
Vicarious humiliation * shame –0.02 0.03 –0.07 0.04 0.60
Devaluation * vicarious humiliation * anger 0.10 0.03 0.05 0.16 <0.001
Devaluation * vicarious humiliation * shame –0.01 0.01 –0.04 0.02 0.51
Effects on avoidance
Devaluation * vicarious humiliation 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.12 0.01
Devaluation * anger –0.02 0.02 –0.06 0.01 0.15
Devaluation * shame 0.01 0.02 –0.03 0.05 0.69
Vicarious humiliation * anger –0.06 0.04 –0.14 0.02 0.15
Vicarious humiliation * shame 0.13 0.06 0.07 0.18 <0.001
Devaluation * vicarious humiliation * anger –0.03 0.02 –0.07 0.01 0.13
Devaluation * vicarious humiliation * shame 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.10 0.02
Experiment 2: Females
Effects on anger
Devaluation * vicarious humiliation 1.04 0.08 0.88 1.20 <0.001
Effects on shame
Devaluation * vicarious humiliation 0.74 0.07 0.61 0.88 <0.001
Effects on approach
Devaluation * vicarious humiliation –0.02 0.08 –0.17 0.14 0.85
Devaluation * anger 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.14 <0.001
Devaluation * shame 0.00 0.00 –0.01 0.01 0.89
Vicarious humiliation * anger 0.22 0.04 0.15 0.30 <0.001
Vicarious humiliation * shame –0.02 0.03 –0.07 0.04 0.60
Devaluation * vicarious humiliation * anger 0.38 0.07 0.26 0.53 <0.001
Devaluation * vicarious humiliation * shame –0.03 0.05 –0.14 0.06 0.54
Effects on avoidance
Devaluation * vicarious humiliation 0.24 0.09 0.06 0.41 0.01
Devaluation * anger –0.02 0.02 –0.06 0.01 0.15
Devaluation * shame 0.01 0.02 –0.03 0.05 0.69
Vicarious humiliation * anger –0.06 0.04 –0.14 0.02 0.15
Vicarious humiliation * shame 0.13 0.06 0.07 0.18 <0.001
Devaluation * vicarious humiliation * anger –0.10 0.07 –0.24 0.04 0.16
Devaluation * vicarious humiliation * shame 0.23 0.06 0.12 0.34 <0.001
Note: Unstandardized regression weights with standard errors and percentile 95% confidence intervals estimated with 2000 
bootstrap samples.
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of ERPP = 0.05/13= 0.0038 for individual paths. In the 
relevant Models 3 and 4 (although not in Model 2, see 
Figure 2), the p-values of all predicted regression weights 
(i.e., devaluing event on humiliation, humiliation on anger 
and shame, anger on approach, shame on avoidance) were 
for all three samples smaller than ERPP (all ps < 0.0035). 
That is, each component of all predicted indirect effects 
was significant, which implies significance of the indirect 
effects as well (Leth-Steensen & Gallitto, 2016). These 
results suggest that witnessing a fellow ingroup mem-
ber being negatively stereotyped was indeed appraised 
as humiliating, which evoked anger and/or shame in our 
participants. To the degree that anger was evoked, partici-
pants self-reported approach intention. To the degree that 
shame was evoked, participants self-reported avoidance 
intention.
Additional explorative analyses
We also found intergroup-specific unpredicted effects. 
Though significant for an unadjusted α-level of 0.05, their 
p-values were all above the adjusted ERPP-threshold of 
0.0038. Thus, they should be interpreted with caution. 
They were, however, not in contradiction to the theory. 
As can be seen in Figure 2, participants of Experiment 2 
(females) were less likely to respond directly with avoid-
ance to the devaluing event unless it was experienced 
as humiliating and shame was elicited. Also visible in 
Figure 2 is that participants of Experiment 3 (males) 
were less likely to respond directly with approach to the 
devaluing event unless it was experienced as humiliat-
ing and/or anger was evoked. Participants of Experiment 
3 also showed a weak but significant direct effect of the 
devaluing event on anger, suggesting that the devaluing 
event might have been appraised by some participants as 
unacceptable, irrespective of its humiliating implication.2 
Participants in Experiment 1 (nationality) showed a weak 
but significant direct path from vicarious humiliation 
to avoidance (Figure 2).3 Finally, we found a significant 
negative path from shame to approach in Experiment 2 
(females, see Figure 2) resulting in an unsurprising nega-
tive indirect effect of the devaluing event through humili-
ation and shame on approach (Table 3).
Discussion
The present research aimed at extending our understand-
ing of vicarious group-based humiliation. Using three real 
intergroup contexts we examined experimentally how 
an event, where a fellow ingroup member is devalued 
by an outgroup member, is appraised and responded to 
emotionally and motivationally. More specifically, we pre-
dicted that witnessing a fellow ingroup member being 
negatively stereotyped by an outgroup member will elicit 
anger-related approach and shame-related avoidance 
insofar as it is experienced as vicariously humiliating.
For all three intergroup contexts we found that when 
an intergroup event is experienced as vicariously humili-
ating, anger and shame do not only blend into the expe-
rience but also regulate motivational tendencies. More 
specifically, we found that vicarious humiliation evoked 
anger and shame in all three contexts and that the 
humiliation-anger blend predicted approach tendencies; 
whereas, the humiliation-shame blend predicted avoid-
ance tendencies. These results are in line with previous 
findings that humiliation, anger, and shame share core 
appraisals, which had been found on the interpersonal 
level (Fernández et al., 2015) and for personally experi-
enced (not vicarious) group membership-based humilia-
tion (Leidner et al., 2012). They are also in line with the 
proposed motivational implications of humiliation as 
sequences of anger-related approach and shame-related 
avoidance (as suggested by Jonas et al., 2014).
However, we found that the effect of witnessing a fellow 
ingroup member being negatively stereotyped on vicari-
ous humiliation did vary between the intergroup contexts. 
Thus, the degree to which the use of negative ingroup ste-
reotypes by an outgroup member is appraised as humiliat-
ing seems to be dependent on the specific meaning that 
such devaluing events have for the respective groups. In 
the present research, the effect was especially strong in 
the context where the devaluing event referred to a nega-
tive stereotype of women (Experiment 2) compared to the 
contexts where it referred to negative stereotypes of South 
African nationals (Experiment 1) or men (Experiment 3). A 
further particularity of the female context (Experiment 2) 
was that shame was not only positively related to avoiding 
males as outgroup members but also negatively related to 
approach them.
Another non-predicted finding refers to the negative 
direct effects between the devaluing event and the two 
motivational responses. For instance, in the female con-
text (Experiment 2) the devaluing event was negatively 
related to avoidance and in the male context (Experiment 
3) it was negatively related to approach when humiliation, 
anger, and shame were statistically controlled. Finally, we 
found an indirect effect of the devaluing event on avoid-
ance mediated by humiliation but bypassing anger and 
shame for the nationality and male contexts.
The findings of the present research have important 
implications. Firstly, in line with the research by Veldhuis 
and colleagues (2014), our results confirm that humilia-
tion can indeed be experienced on behalf of another per-
son with whom one shares a group membership. Adding 
to the research by Veldhuis and colleagues (2014), the pre-
sent research implies that witnessing an ingroup member 
being negatively stereotyped by an outgroup member, 
much like witnessing an ingroup member being ostra-
cized in Veldhuis and colleagues’ (2014) studies, elicits 
the feeling of humiliation. Different from the findings of 
Veldhuis and colleagues (2014), humiliation in our studies 
was blended with not just anger but also shame, which 
supports our propositions that appraisals of vicariously 
humiliating events and the resulting emotional blends 
exceed injustice, powerlessness, and anger. Moreover, 
our results showed that individuals who witness a fel-
low ingroup member being devalued respond with either 
approach and/or avoidance tendencies even if they are 
not personally involved. For that to happen, it is not nec-
essary that individuals put themselves in the shoes of the 
fellow ingroup member; it is sufficient that the humilia-
tion refers to an aspect of the shared group membership. 
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This result is important for understanding intergroup con-
flicts as it implies that even humiliating one member of a 
group can elicit humiliation in other group members and 
consequently result in tendencies of approach and avoid-
ance that are potentially harmful for intergroup relations.
Secondly, previous research was ambiguous about the 
relative importance of anger-related approach and shame-
related avoidance for intergroup humiliation (Ginges & 
Atran, 2008; Goldman, 2008; van Driel, 2011). The present 
research found that once individuals appraised a devalu-
ing event as vicariously humiliating, anger and shame 
responses were elicited to a fairly similar degree. The dif-
ference between our results and those of previous research 
could be attributed to the contexts in which humiliation 
was studied. For instance, the medical students studied by 
van Driel (2011) might have taken into account that in 
the future their group (doctors) will clearly be in a higher 
status position than the humiliator group (nurses), which 
might have increased the likelihood of moral outrage. 
Moreover, the present research differed from previous 
studies methodologically in that participants experienced 
intergroup humiliation only vicariously. That was not 
always the case in previous research. One could specu-
late that the stronger personal involvement in some of 
the previous studies might have reduced the variability of 
emotional blends in response to humiliation in the partic-
ular context. For instance, the so-called inertia effect (the 
tendency towards inaction that suppresses rebellious or 
violent action) reported by Ginges and Atran (2008) might 
be the result of their participants’ personal history of 
repeated experiences of powerlessness within the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. These authors juxtapose their results 
with reports of militants who often attribute their actions 
to humiliation. They speculate that ‘those involved in vio-
lent rebellion witness the frequent humiliation of others 
who they identify with […] without internalizing the expe-
rience as humiliating […]. In this way they avoid the inertia 
effect and instead respond with moral outrage’ (Ginges 
& Atran, 2008: 292). This speculation is actually consist-
ent with our findings that anger-related approach and 
shame-related avoidance are possible as a result of vicari-
ous humiliation. We propose that future research should 
therefore focus on factors that determine whether one or 
the other or both responses are more likely depending on 
the characteristics of certain contexts.
Thirdly, as mentioned before, the present research 
found that groups differ in how much they appraise the 
devaluing event as humiliating. We speculate that these 
varying effects are due to specific factors that intensify 
the experience of vicarious humiliation. The first is self-
relevance. The negative characteristics referred to in our 
manipulations might have differed in their normative 
fit to the ingroup stereotype that is part of people’s self-
concept (Turner et al., 1987). Moreover, how central an 
ingroup stereotype is for people’s self-concept depends 
on their identification with the group. In line with inter-
group emotion theory (Smith et al., 2007), which assumes 
that group-level emotions depend on the individual’s level 
of ingroup identification, we could speculate that female 
participants appraised the situation as more humiliating 
because they identified stronger with their group. Another 
factor is audience. Previous research showed that the pres-
ence of an audience, especially a hostile audience, inten-
sifies the feeling of humiliation (Elison & Harter, 2007; 
Mann et al., 2017). In our manipulations, the devaluing 
event was always framed as happening in the presence 
of an audience, but the audience differed from context 
to context. What was unique to the female context was 
that the audience was explicitly framed as being members 
of the outgroup (different from the nationality context) 
and at the same time actively participating in the devalu-
ing event by laughing (different from the male context). 
Apart from self-relevance and audience, it is also impor-
tant how much the humiliating message contradicts one’s 
self-knowledge. For instance, the relatively strong effect in 
Experiment 2 might have resulted from the discrepancy 
between the stereotype about females’ alleged (in)ability 
to drive and participants’ knowledge about the social real-
ity where most car accidents are caused by males. More 
research is necessary to systematically identify the most 
relevant factors that influence the intensity felt in the 
experience of a devaluing intergroup event.
The fourth implication of our research relates to the neg-
ative, direct effects observed between the devaluing event 
and the motivational responses. These results suggest that 
other processes than the elicitation of vicarious humilia-
tion, and the feelings of anger and shame, are involved. 
We suspect that context-specific social norms might be at 
play, in that the normative framework in which the deval-
uing event occurs renders certain responses more appro-
priate than others. For instance, the broader discourse 
on females’ inability to drive (Experiment 2) and males’ 
tendency to be violent towards women (Experiment 3), 
as well as the public endorsement of these negative ste-
reotypes, might have rendered the responses with avoid-
ance and approach, respectively, less appropriate in these 
contexts.
As mentioned before, our experiments did not only 
vary with regard to the intergroup context but also with 
regard to whether the audience was specified as outgroup 
(Experiment 2 and Experiment 3); whether the audience 
was laughing (Experiment 1 and Experiment 2) or rather 
hostile (Experiment 3); and whether the fellow ingroup 
member stated feeling humiliated (Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2) or taken aback (Experiment 3). These vari-
abilities in the stories of course gave rise to various and 
probably different covariates that might have influenced 
the present results. Nevertheless, our main findings were 
consistent across the three contexts, which seems to indi-
cate that the result that motivational tendencies to vicari-
ous humiliation are mostly regulated by anger and shame 
is remarkably robust. The regulation by anger and shame 
raises the question of whether vicarious humiliation is a 
distinct emotion or rather an appraisal that usually results 
in emotions such as anger and shame. Our consistent 
mediations seem to speak for the latter case. On the other 
hand, the findings of the indirect effect of the devaluing 
event on avoidance, which was due to the direct path from 
vicarious humiliation to avoidance, would speak against 
it. However, this weak effect was only significant in one 
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of our three contexts (Experiment 1 using South African 
nationals as target group), and yet, it points also to the 
possibility that apart from anger and shame other feel-
ings, such as embarrassment, guilt (Elison & Harter, 2007) 
or contempt (Ellsworth & Tong, 2006), might be involved 
in the experience of humiliation. Future research is neces-
sary to clarify these questions.
Another implication of our research is that sometimes 
the link between the feelings and the motivational ten-
dencies can be more complex than what the anger-related 
approach and shame-related avoidance sequences would 
suggest. For instance, in Experiment 2 (females as target 
group), the feeling of shame was not only positively related 
to avoidance but also negatively to approach. This result is 
interesting as it implies that the humiliation-shame blend 
might not only activate withdrawal but can also inhibit 
the engagement in active approach (Corr, 2013) and 
thereby contributes to the preservation of the status quo 
in oppressive intergroup relations (e.g., Ginges & Atran, 
2008). Indeed, as approach tendencies were operational-
ized as a form of collective action (e.g., signing a petition), 
these results suggest that the role of humiliation in inter-
group relations is ambiguous. On the one hand, they show 
that the humiliation-anger blend stimulates individuals’ 
willingness to act collectively (e.g., van Zomeren et al., 
2012), and on the other hand, they also suggest that in 
certain intergroup contexts the emotional blend of humil-
iation and shame may preclude individuals from acting 
collectively. Although this result was only found in one 
of the three experiments, it might be worthwhile study-
ing in the future those conditions under which emotions 
prevent certain behaviors rather than evoke them.
Despite the important implications of our research, 
we would like to stress that we are unable to infer a 
causal process between vicarious humiliation and moti-
vational outcomes as we only experimentally manipu-
lated the devaluing event. A second limitation refers 
to the use of self-reported motivational tendencies, 
which of course present at best an approximation to 
actual motivation and subsequent behavioral inten-
tions. Although several studies provided evidence that 
the hypothetical choices made in experimental studies 
corresponded to a large degree with actual behavior 
(Diehl et al., 2013; Hainmueller et al., 2015), one might 
argue that the external validity of behavioral intentions 
measured in factorial experimental designs is limited 
as participants might not give any thought to the sce-
narios presented to them as manipulations (e.g., Beck & 
Opp, 2001; see Hainmueller et al., 2015). Indeed, partic-
ipants’ responses to the scenarios might have been par-
tially influenced by several factors, such as social norms, 
social desirability concerns, or mood effects, which were 
not controlled in our studies. Thirdly, our measures of 
motivations to approach and to avoid differed in their 
targets. While the measure of avoidance targeted the 
humiliator, the measure of approach referred vaguely 
to a third party. Another limitation refers to impor-
tant variables that were not measured in our experi-
ments including identification with the ingroup, the 
distinct appraisals of anger and shame, and additional 
emotions, such as embarrassment, guilt, or contempt, 
as discussed above. Future research should overcome 
these limitations.
Overall, the present research contributes to our under-
standing of the dynamics of humiliation, which is often 
referred to in academic and public discourses as the emo-
tional link between devaluing intergroup events and the 
escalation of intergroup conflicts. Indeed, our results sup-
port the notion that an individual does not need to be 
personally devalued in order to experience humiliation 
and to respond with anger-related approach and shame-
related avoidance as long as the devaluation refers to a 
meaningful social identity that one shares with the target. 
Certainly, many factors contribute to the development 
and perpetuation of intergroup conflicts apart from the 
humiliation of one person. However, as humiliation is 
experienced on behalf of fellow group members, it can be 
a catalyst of escalations.
Notes
 1 Our assessment was supported by an extensive search 
of the relevant databases, such as PsycArticles, Psy-
cInfo, EBSCO, and Google Scholar, using the keywords 
humiliation in combination with intergroup, group-
based, group based, vicarious or vicariously. Searches 
were conducted from the earliest available data until 
December 2020.
 2 As a result, the positive indirect effect of the devaluing 
event through anger on approach, bypassing vicari-
ous humiliation, was significant in Model 4 (Table 3). 
In Model 3, this indirect effect was significant for the 
combined results of Experiment 1 and Experiment 
3 but not for Experiment 2 (Appendix 2. Table 1, 
 available under osf.io/tmzps).
 3 As a result, the positive indirect effect of the devalu-
ing event through vicarious humiliation on avoidance, 
bypassing anger and shame, was significant in Model 4 
(Table 3). In Model 3, this indirect effect was significant 
for the combined results of Experiment 1 and Experi-
ment 3 but not for Experiment 2 (Appendix 2. Table 1, 
available under osf.io/tmzps).
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